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3.1 Introduction
There is a growing consensus among economists that diﬀerences in in-
stitutions, in particular the enforcement of property rights, rule of law, and
constraints placed on politicians and elites, have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on
long-run economic development (see, among others, North and Thomas
1973; Jones 1981; North 1981; Olson 1982). Recent empirical ﬁndings sup-
port this notion. There is a strong correlation between institutions and eco-
nomic and ﬁnancial development (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro
1995; La Porta et al. 1998; and Hall and Jones 1999), especially when we
look at the historically determined diﬀerences in institutions (e.g., Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2002).
In this paper and a companion paper, Acemoglu et al. (2003), we argue
that institutions also have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on short- and medium-run
economic instability. We document that societies that have weak institu-
tions for historical reasons have suﬀered substantially more output volatil-
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ference for their suggestions.ity and experienced more severe output, exchange rate, banking, and po-
litical crises over the past thirty years. The link we document between the
historically determined component of institutions and economic instabil-
ity calls for a quite diﬀerent view of medium-run macroeconomic volatil-
ity, and for more work to understand the relationship between institutions
and volatility. This paper is therefore meant more as a progress report to
encourage others to investigate these issues.
To isolate the historically determined (and plausibly exogenous) com-
ponent of diﬀerences in institutions, we build on Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001, 2002). These papers focus on countries that were colo-
nized by European powers. This is an attractive sample for understanding
the role of institutions in economic development because the intervention
of Europeans, setting up very diﬀerent institutions in various parts of the
globe, is the closest we have to a natural social experiment in the creation
of institutions.1
In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) we documented that diﬀer-
ent colonization strategies and diﬀerent institutions set up by Europeans
had radically diﬀerent implications for economic development. Places
prospered when Europeans set up institutions that protected private prop-
erty rights, enforced the rule of law, and placed tight constraints on politi-
cians and powerful elites. In contrast, areas where Europeans established
new extractive institutions, or took over existing ones, stagnated or grew
only slowly. We demonstrated the eﬀect of historical institutions on eco-
nomic development by exploiting variation in the feasibility of large-scale
settlements by Europeans. Where the disease environment was favorable
for Europeans to settle, Europeans settled in large numbers and developed
institutions very similar to, or even substantially better than, institutions
in Europe. These settler colonies, such as the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia, or New Zealand, have grown steadily over the past 200 years, espe-
cially taking advantage of the opportunity to industrialize. In many other
colonies—for example, in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Central
America—Europeans faced high or very high mortality rates, and settle-
ment was not feasible. In these areas, the colonizers were much more likely
to develop extractive institutions, used mostly to exploit the native popu-
lation for the beneﬁt of a few rich Europeans, and these institutions have
often proved incompatible with sustained rapid growth.
Based on this argument, we used the mortality rates faced by European
settlers as an instrument for institutional development and current institu-
tions. Figure 3.1 shows the reduced-form relationship between income per
capita (our measure of long-term development) today and mortality rates
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1. There may also be diﬀerences in the institutional development of colonized and noncol-
onized countries (e.g., Japan and Thailand), but this is harder to analyze and not part of this
paper.faced by settlers (log of the mortality rates per annum per 1,000 settlers,
where each person who dies is replaced) more than 150 years ago. There is
a strong and robust relationship. Places where Europeans faced much
higher mortality rates are signiﬁcantly poorer today. In Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson (2001) we documented that the relationship between in-
come per capita today and settler mortality in the past most likely works
through institutional development, does not reﬂect the eﬀect of diseases on
the local population, and is not caused by other omitted characteristics
that are correlated with the mortality rates faced by settlers.
The current paper highlights a surprisingly strong relationship between
these mortality rates and various measures of instability and crises during
the past thirty to forty years. As in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2001), our interpretation is that this relationship reﬂects the eﬀect of his-
torically determined institutions (more speciﬁcally, institutions shaped by
diﬀerential European colonization strategies and settlement patterns) on
instability. In other words, not only did societies that inherited extractive
institutions from their colonial past fail to take advantage of development
opportunities over the long run, but their recent medium-run experience
has been characterized by frequent crises and substantial instability.
Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 show the relationship between our (log) settler
mortality measure and various measures of volatility since 1970. Figure 3.2
shows the relationship between the standard deviation of gross domestic
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Fig. 3.1 Settler mortality and income todayFig. 3.2 Volatility of output against log settler mortality
Fig. 3.3 Worst output drop against log settler mortalityproduct (GDP) growth between 1970 and 1997 and settler mortality.2 Fig-
ure 3.3 depicts the relationship between the largest output drop during the
same period (as a measure of severity of crises) and settler mortality. Fig-
ure 3.4 presents the largest real exchange rate depreciation against settler
mortality as a way of showing the relationship between balance-of-
payment crises and our measure of historical institutions. These ﬁgures
document that there is a strong relationship between this historical vari-
able and the propensity of these societies to experience output volatility, se-
vere output collapses, and balance-of-payment crises. We will show later
that there is also a strong robust positive relationship between log settler
mortality and the incidence of banking and political crises.3
Our argument is that these reduced-form relationships reﬂect the eﬀect
of institutions on economic instability. Societies with weak institutions not
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2. We drop two outliers, Gabon and Rwanda, from this ﬁgure to make the pattern clearer.
This does not change the relationship, and these countries are included in the regression anal-
ysis that follows.
3. The reduced-form coeﬃcients on log settler mortality in the regressions corresponding
to ﬁgures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are 0.66 (standard error 0.18, R2 0.19, 67 observations) using out-
put volatility, 2.3 (standard error 0.6, R2 0.19, 68 observations) using worst output drop, and
0.038 (standard error 0.021, R2 0.05, 66 observations) using largest real exchange rate depre-
ciation. In addition, we report results for banking crises and political crises. The regression of
a dummy for a systemic banking crisis on log settler mortality gives a coeﬃcient of 0.15 and
the standard error is 0.062, with 37 observations and an R2of 0.15. The regression of a dummy
for political crisis on log settler mortality gives a coeﬃcient 0.15, and the standard error is
0.039, with 80 observations and an R2 of 0.17.
Fig. 3.4 Largest real exchange rate depreciation against log settler mortalityonly fail to take advantage of economic opportunities but also experience
signiﬁcant political struggles and associated economic instability. In the
rest of the paper, we build the case that the relationship between settler
mortality and instability indeed reﬂects the causal eﬀect of institutions on
economic and political instability. We also show that this relationship is ro-
bust to the inclusion of various controls for other potential determinants of
instability. The same relationship also holds if we restrict the sample to just
countries above median world income or to just former British colonies.
Our results suggest that there is a ﬁrst-order eﬀect of institutions on eco-
nomic and political instability. In short, institutional weaknesses not only
cause slow growth over long periods of time (e.g., 50–100 years) but are
also associated with higher volatility and instability over 20- to 40-year pe-
riods. Although there are natural and intuitive reasons to expect such a re-
lationship between institutions and instability, the precise mechanisms are
not clear. A great deal more research is needed on the theoretical and em-
pirical relationship between institutional weaknesses and instability.
In a related work, Acemoglu et al. (2003) show that the results reported
here for output volatility and worst drop in output are robust to including
a wide range of alternative measures of institutions and macroeconomic
variables. They also present evidence that institutions determine macro-
economic policies such as government consumption and the extent of real
exchange rate overvaluation, and that these distortionary macroeconomic
policies have little eﬀect on volatility once the direct eﬀect of underlying in-
stitutions is taken into account.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section motivates
the use of settler mortality as an instrument for the historically determined
component of institutions. It also describes the settler mortality variable
and shows the relationship between settler mortality and current institu-
tions. Section 3.3 documents the relationship between various measures of
instability and the historically determined component of institutions. It
also documents that these relationships are robust to the inclusion of the
obvious control variables. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Historical Determinants of Institutions in Former European Colonies
3.2.1 Settler Mortality as an Instrumental Variable
The set of former European colonies provides an attractive sample for
isolating the historically determined component of institutions, since the
institutions in almost all former colonies have been heavily inﬂuenced by
their colonial experience (see La Porta et al., 1998, and Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson, 2001, for more detailed discussions). Speciﬁcally,
many important dimensions of institutions in former colonies were shaped
by the strategy of colonization.
In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), we contrasted insti-
76 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinsontutions of private property, which place eﬀective constraints on elites and
rulers and do protect the property rights of a broad segment of society, and
extractive institutions, which fail to impose constraints on elites and politi-
cians and do not provide secure property rights for the majority of the pop-
ulation. We argued that institutions of private property were more likely to
arise when Europeans settled in large numbers and set up institutions pro-
tecting economic and political rights for themselves. The “neo-Europes”—
the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—are perhaps the
best examples of European settlement associated with the development of
good institutions. In contrast, extractive institutions emerged when Euro-
peans pursued a strategy of extracting various types of resources from the
colonies without settling and without developing participatory institu-
tions. Note that we are not arguing that institutions are immutable and
unchanging over time. Rather our historical analysis suggests that institu-
tions persist: that is, although institutions do change over time, the initial
colonial form of these institutions continues to have some eﬀect for at least
several hundred years.
This reasoning suggests that in places where the disease environment was
not favorable to European health and settlement Europeans could not set-
tle, and the cards were stacked against the development of institutions of
private property. Based on this reasoning, we use measures of mortality rates
experienced by early actual and potential European settlers in the colonies
as an instrument for historical and current institutions in these countries.
Schematically, the reasoning underlying this instrumentation strategy is
(potential)  → settlements → early → current → current
settler institutions institutions performance
mortality
Based on this reasoning, we use data on the mortality rates of soldiers,
bishops, and sailors stationed in the colonies between the seventeenth and
nineteenth centuries (Curtin 1989, 1998; Gutierrez 1986). These give a
good indication of the mortality rates faced by settlers. Europeans were
well informed about these mortality rates at the time, even though they did
not know how to control the diseases that caused these high mortality
rates, especially yellow fever and malaria (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2001, for more detail).4
An important issue is of course the validity of the exclusion restriction
presumed by this instrumentation strategy—that is, whether the mortality
rates faced by the settlers between the seventeenth and nineteenth cen-
turies could actually have an eﬀect on current outcomes through another
channel. Our instrument would not be valid, for example, if there were a
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4. The diﬀerences in mortality rates were large (see appendix table A2 in Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson 2001). For a settlement size maintained through replacement of 1,000 Eu-
ropeans before 1850, the annual mortality rates ranged from 8.55 in New Zealand (lower than
in Europe at that time) to 49 in India, 130 in Jamaica, and around 500 in West Africa.strong correlation between European mortality rates over 150 years ago
and the health of the current population or climate, and if current health
and climate aﬀects current economic outcomes. However, the majority of
European deaths in the colonies were caused by malaria and yellow fever.
Although these diseases were fatal to Europeans, who had no immunity,
they had much less eﬀect on indigenous adults, who had developed various
types of immunities. These diseases are therefore unlikely to be the reason
why many countries in Africa and Asia are poor today.
This notion is supported by the mortality rates of local people in high–
settler mortality areas, which were comparable to the mortality rates of
British troops serving in Britain or in healthier colonies. Moreover, yellow
fever is essentially eradicated today, so this component of the mortality
rates faced by Europeans more than 150 years ago should not have a direct
eﬀect on income or other outcomes today. To substantiate the validity of
our instrumentation approach, in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2001) we showed that the results are robust to controlling for climate, hu-
midity, other geographic variables, and current health conditions, and that
we obtain very similar results by exploiting only diﬀerences in European
mortality due to yellow fever. On the basis of these ﬁndings, we take mor-
tality rates of European settlers between the seventeenth and nineteenth
centuries as an instrument for current institutions in the former colonies.
3.2.2 Measuring Contemporary Institutions
What are the institutions that matter? In our empirical analysis here, we
use an institutional variable for which we have data for a broad cross sec-
tion of countries at the beginning of the sample: constraints placed on the
executive, as measured in the Polity IV data set based on the work of
Robert Gurr. For every independent country, the Polity IV data set reports
a qualitative score, between 1 and 7, measuring the extent of constitutional
limits on the exercise of arbitrary power by the executive. This “constraint
on the executive” variable is conceptually attractive because it measures in-
stitutional and other constraints that are placed on presidents and dicta-
tors (or monarchies).
Theoretically, we expect a society where elites and politicians are eﬀec-
tively constrained to experience less inﬁghting between various groups to
take control of the state, and to pursue more sustainable policies (see Ace-
moglu et al. 2003). Nevertheless, constraint on the executive is only one
measure of institutions, and it is quite possible that a country might have
adequate constraints on the executive, but suﬀer from corruption or weak
property rights for other reasons. More generally, the relevant institutions
are a cluster of social arrangements that include constitutional and social
limits on politicians’ and elites’ power, the rule of law, provisions for medi-
ating social cleavages, strong property rights enforcement, a minimum
amount of equal opportunity, and the like. This cluster determines whether
agents with investment opportunities will undertake these investments,
78 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinsonwhether there will be signiﬁcant swings in the political and social environ-
ment leading to crises, and whether politicians will be induced to pursue
unsustainable policies in order to remain in power in the face of deep so-
cial cleavages. Therefore, we prefer to be relatively loose on what the fun-
damental institutional problems are, and instead we try to isolate the his-
torically determined component of these institutional diﬀerences.
Figure 3.5 shows the ﬁrst-stage relationship between our constraint on
the executive variable (average value for 1950, 1960, and 1970) and the log
of European settler mortality in annualized deaths per thousand mean
strength. This measure reports the death rate among 1,000 soldiers per
year where each death is replaced with a new soldier and was the standard
measure in the army records from which much of our information comes.
We use logs rather than levels, because otherwise some of the African ob-
servations are extreme outliers. The ﬁgure shows a strong relationship be-
tween the measure of institutions used in this paper and settler mortality
more than 150 years ago. Our interpretation is that this reﬂects the causal
eﬀect of colonial policies on current institutions, and hence it can serve as
a useful source of variation for identifying the eﬀect of institutions on
macroeconomic outcomes.
3.2.3 Institutions and Economic Outcomes
We now brieﬂy examine the relationship between the historically deter-
mined component of institutions and current per capita income and recent
growth rates. The ﬁrst column in panel A of table 3.1 replicates our main
Institutions, Volatility, and Crises 79





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.regression from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), which looks at
the eﬀect of institutional diﬀerences on (log) income per capita today. Our
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimate of the eﬀect of institutions on in-
come per capita is relatively precisely estimated and large. For example, it
implies that improving Nigeria’s institutions to the level of Chile could lead
to a sevenfold increase in Nigeria’s income (Chile currently has per capita
income more than eleven times that of Nigeria).5
The lower part of panel A shows the ﬁrst-stage relationship between in-
stitutions and log of potential European settler mortality. In Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001), we used average protection against expro-
priation risk between 1985 and 1995 as our measure of institutions. We do
not focus on this measure in the current paper, since we prefer a measure
that refers to the beginning of our sample period (i.e., 1970), and the pro-
tection against expropriation variable is not available for the 1960s and
1970s. Column (4) replicates the same regression as column (1) with the
“constraint on the executive” variable that we use throughout this paper.
The ﬁrst-stage relationship for this regression is shown in ﬁgure 3.5. Mor-
tality rates faced by early European settlers explain over 25 percent of the
variation in this measure of current institutions.
Columns (7) and (10) turn to a regression of the average growth rate be-
tween 1970 and 1997 on constraint on the executive before 1970, again in-
strumented by log settler mortality (with or without controlling for initial
income). We express growth rates in percentage points (e.g., 2 percent
rather than 0.02) to save on decimal points; see table 3A.3 for summary sta-
tistics. Column (7) shows a statistically signiﬁcant relationship, indicating
faster growth since 1970 among countries with better historically deter-
mined institutions. For example, the coeﬃcient of 0.75 implies that a coun-
try like the United States, with a value of constraint on the executive of 7,
is predicted to grow about 3 percent a year faster than a country like Nige-
ria, with a score of 3. The estimate of the eﬀect of initial “constraint on the
executive” on growth becomes larger when we control for initial income in
column (10), but also the standard error more than triples (the coeﬃcient
is still statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level).6
It is useful to know whether the relationship between the historically de-
termined component of institutions and economic outcomes is driven
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5. Note that the comparisons of countries here and later in the text are only intended to be
illustrative. They do not imply anything about the “ﬁt” of the regression.
6. That the eﬀect of historically determined institutions on post-1970 growth becomes
weaker when we control for initial income is not surprising. Initial income (i.e., income per
capita 1970) is determined largely by historical institutions, so our measure of institutions
and initial income are highly correlated. In fact, much of the divergence among the former
colonies took place between 1750 and 1950, when countries with good institutions took ad-
vantage of industrialization opportunities and those with extractive institutions failed to do
so (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002). So our measure of institutions is as good a
determinant of income level in 1970 as subsequent growth.mainly by the contrast between rich and poor nations. Columns (2), (5),
(8), and (11) report regressions for countries above the median world per
capita income in 1970 (using the Summers-Heston income per capita data
for that year, from Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002). In these regressions,
and all those in subsequent tables that use this subsample, we drop Gabon,
which is an outlier with high volatility (including Gabon in this sample
does not change the results). In table 3.1, the estimates for this subsample
are similar to, but lower than, those for the sample of all ex-colonies. They
continue to be highly signiﬁcant in income level regressions (columns [2]
and [5]) but are only signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level in the growth regres-
sions (columns [8] and [11]).
Finally, columns (3), (6), (9), and (12) report regressions for ex-colonies
without Africa, to show that the eﬀect of the historically determined com-
ponent of institutions on income level and growth is not driven by a con-
trast between African and non-African nations. In this smaller sample, the
2SLS estimate of the eﬀect of institutions on economics outcome is again
lower than that for all ex-colonies. Nevertheless, this estimate is still signif-
icant at the 5 percent level in the income level regressions and signiﬁcant at
the 10 percent in the growth regressions. In the subsequent analysis, we
ﬁnd that the results without Africa are similar to those that use former
colonies above median world per capita income, so we just report the
latter.7
3.3 Institutions and Measures of Crises
3.3.1 Identiﬁcation Strategy
The economic relationship we are interested in identifying is
(1) Xc,t 1,t      Ic,t 1   Z  c,t 1,t    εc,t 1,t,
where Xc,t–1,t is the outcome of interest for country c between times t and
t – 1. The ﬁve outcomes that we will look at are overall volatility (standard
deviation of growth), severity of crises (worst output drop), largest real ex-
change rate depreciation, a dummy for banking crises, and a measure of
political crises. In our baseline regressions, the time period will be from
1970 to 1997 (this choice is dictated by data availability and our desire to
start the analysis at a point in time where all countries in our sample are in-
dependent nation states). We examined alternative time periods, for ex-
ample starting in 1960 or 1980, and did not ﬁnd any important diﬀerence
in results.
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7. Omitting Africa is also informative on the question of whether the length of colonial con-
trol was important. Much of Africa was under formal colonial rule only brieﬂy. Nevertheless,
it was under European inﬂuence since at least 1600 through slave trading and other interac-
tions.Ic,t–1 is our measure of institutions at the beginning of the sample, con-
structed as the average value for the constraint on the executive measure
from the Polity IV data set for 1950, 1960, and 1970. In taking this average,
we assign the lowest score to countries that are not yet independent (and
that are therefore not in the Polity IV data set).8 This is reasonable because
in a country still under colonial control there are typically few real con-
straints on the power of the rulers. In addition, Zc,t–1,t is a set of other con-
trols, ranging from macro variables, to ﬁnancial development variables, to
other determinants of economic instability, such as terms of trade shocks
etc.9
The parameter that we are interested in identifying is  , the eﬀect of in-
stitutions. The simplest strategy is to estimate the model in equation (1) us-
ing ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. There are two problems with
this strategy: (1) Institutions are endogenous, so we may be capturing re-
verse causality, or the eﬀect of some omitted characteristics (geography,
culture, or other variables) on both institutions and economic outcomes;
and (2) institutions are measured with error, and the variable we have does
not correspond to the desired concept. In particular, although the institu-
tions we have in mind are multidimensional, constraint on the executive
only measures one of these dimensions, and that quite imperfectly.
Both of these concerns imply that OLS regressions will give results that
are diﬃcult to interpret and that do not correspond to the causal eﬀect of
institutions and policy variables on economic outcomes. Ideally, we would
like to estimate equation (1) using 2SLS with a plausible instrument for in-
stitutions. This instrument should be correlated with the endogenous re-
gressors and should be orthogonal to any other omitted characteristics and
not correlated with the outcomes of interest through any channel other
than their eﬀect via the endogenous regressors (i.e., institutions).
In this paper, we pursue the strategy of instrumenting for institutions
using the historically determined component of institutions, speciﬁcally
from the colonial experience of former colonies, as discussed in the previ-
ous section. To the extent that the instrument is valid, it will solve the en-
dogeneity, the omitted variables bias, and the measurement error prob-
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8. We take these averages rather than simply using the 1970 value of the index, since we are
interested in the long-run component of these constraints (not in the year-to-year ﬂuctua-
tions) and also because the Polity data set gives very high scores to a number of former
colonies in 1970 that subsequently drop by a large amount. This reﬂects the fact that many of
these countries adopted the constitution of their former colonial powers but did not really im-
plement the constitution or introduce eﬀective checks. Using simply the 1970 value of the
constraints on the executive gives very similar results.
9. In Acemoglu et al. (2003) we report regression results with and without the log of initial
income per capita. Following Barro (1991) this variable is included in most growth regressions
to control for convergence eﬀects. It is also useful to include it in regressions of volatility or
crises because, as shown in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), poorer countries suﬀer substan-
tially more volatility. However, we ﬁnd that including initial income per capita does not
change our basic results, so it is omitted here. This suggests that institutions aﬀect volatility
through mechanisms other than their eﬀect on income per capita.lems. In particular, if the instrument is valid, we can estimate the eﬀect of
institutions on economic outcomes, the  parameters, consistently in mod-
els that exclude other potentially endogenous controls, such as the macro
policy variables. In Acemoglu et al. (2003), we adopt a variety of strategies
to deal with the potential endogeneity of macro policy variables. Here we
simply treat all controls, including the macro variables, as exogenous. This
strategy typically creates an upward bias in the eﬀect of these controls and
a potential downward bias in  , the eﬀect of institutions on instability (see
the appendix of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). We therefore
pursue this strategy here since it is conservative, in the sense of stacking the
cards against ﬁnding a substantial role for institutions.
3.3.2 Output Volatility
Table 3.2 shows the relationship between institutions and volatility. Col-
umn (1) reports the OLS relationship between the standard deviation of
output growth (measured by real GDP per capita) and our measure of in-
stitutions. This OLS relationship is shown in ﬁgure 3.6. Column (2) shows
the estimated 2SLS result when we instrument for institutions using log
settler mortality. These results suggest that countries with institutional
problems suﬀer substantially more volatility. For example, the estimate of
–0.79 in column (2) implies that a 1 point higher score in the institutional
index translates into about a 0.79 decline in the standard deviation of
growth. To get an idea of magnitudes, note that on the basis of this esti-
mate, we should expect a country like the United States, which has an in-
stitutional score of 7, to have a standard deviation 3.16 lower than a coun-
try like Nigeria, which has an institutional score of 3.10
Columns (4) through (9) show that the 2SLS relationship between out-
put volatility and institutions is robust when we include the obvious con-
trol variables. Column (4) controls for three important macroeconomic
variables: log average inﬂation, which is the log of average annual inﬂation
in the Consumer Price Index from 1970 to 1997, from the World Bank;
government consumption, which is the average of the ratio of real govern-
ment “consumption” expenditure to real GDP from 1970 to 1989, from the
Barro and Lee (1993) data set; and real exchange rate overvaluation, which
is an index of real overvaluation of the oﬃcial exchange rate during 1970–
98, constructed by Easterly and Levine (2003) using the methodology of
Dollar (1992). In this case, the coeﬃcient on institutions falls in absolute
value to –0.48 but remains signiﬁcant. None of the macro variables are sig-
niﬁcant.11
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10. This gap is approximately two-thirds of the actual gap in standard deviation between
the United States (7.37) and Nigeria (2.16) in the data, which is 5.21. This comparison is for
illustrative purposes only and not to show the ﬁt of the regression.
11. Acemoglu et al. (2003) look at alternative macroeconomic variables and present a larger



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Column (5) includes the log of M2 over GDP, using averages for 1970–
97 (see Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz, 2000, for the use of this variable in this
context). Many macroeconomists emphasize weak ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion as a primary cause of economic volatility. We also ﬁnd no strong evi-
dence supporting this claim. The ﬁnancial intermediation variables are not
signiﬁcant, while the institutions variable is still signiﬁcant, with a coeﬃ-
cient of –0.76 and standard error of 0.28.
Column (6) includes the standard deviation of terms of trade shocks in
1970–89 times export-GDP ratio in 1970, from the Barro and Lee (1993)
data set. This measures the openness to the economy and, in particular, its
vulnerability to ﬂuctuations in traded goods prices (e.g., this measure is
higher if the country exports more primary commodities). In this column
the coeﬃcient on institutions is essentially unchanged compared with our
base case: coeﬃcient of –0.76 (standard error of 0.2). This measure of the
terms of trade is also signiﬁcant.
Column (7) includes the share of primary exports in GDP in 1970 from
Sachs and Warner (1997). This is both a basic measure of openness and ex-
posure to shocks and a way to control for the importance of natural re-
sources in the economy. In this case the coeﬃcient on institutions increases
to –0.8, while the standard error is virtually unchanged at 0.21.
Column (8) includes the absolute value of latitude (distance of a coun-
try’s capital from the equator). This is a standard control variable repre-
senting the potential eﬀect of geographical factors. Here the coeﬃcient on
institutions falls slightly in absolute value to –0.73, and the standard error
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Fig. 3.6 Volatility of output against average constraint on executiveincreases to 0.24, but institutions are still highly signiﬁcant. Latitude itself
is not signiﬁcant.
Column (9) includes the fraction of the population that was Muslim,
Catholic, and Protestant in 1980 (with “other” as the omitted group; see La
Porta et al. 1999). The coeﬃcient on institutions now increases in absolute
size to –0.9, and the standard error is 0.23. The religion variables are jointly
not signiﬁcant.
Columns (3) and (10) look at subsamples of our ex-colonies sample. Col-
umn (3) includes only those former colonies that have above-median world
income per capita. In this case, we ﬁnd a larger coeﬃcient in absolute terms
(–1.02) and a somewhat higher standard error (0.29). Column (10) restricts
attention to just those countries that were formerly British colonies. In this
case the coeﬃcient (–0.75) and standard error (0.23) are almost identical
to those reported in column (2).
Overall these results indicate two robust ﬁndings. The ﬁrst is that initial
institutions are strongly correlated with subsequent output volatility. The
second is that most other potential control variables are not signiﬁcant de-
terminants of volatility. This is the case even though, to stack the cards
against us, we use contemporaneous values of these controls, so any endo-
geneity (e.g., more volatility leading to less ﬁnancial development) would
tend to bias the coeﬃcients upward. The only signiﬁcant determinant of
volatility in table 3.2, other than institutions, is terms-of-trade shocks.
3.3.3 Worst Drop in Output
Table 3.3 presents a number of speciﬁcations that look at the impact of
institutions on the severity of crises, measured by the largest output drop
between 1970 and 1997. In the IV regressions, our measure of institu-
tions—constraint on the executive—is instrumented by European settler
mortality. We use the same control variables and alternative samples as in
table 3.2.
Worst output drop is deﬁned so that a larger positive number means a
bigger fall in GDP per capita. The OLS coeﬃcient on institutions, in col-
umn (1), is –1.28, and the standard error is 0.41. The OLS relationship is
shown in ﬁgure 3.7. When we instrument for institutions—for example, in
column (2)—the coeﬃcient increases in absolute value to –2.27, while the
standard error rises to 0.7.
The alternative speciﬁcations in table 3.3 show that institutions are ro-
bustly signiﬁcant. Including the macro variables in column (4) reduces the
coeﬃcient on institutions slightly, but again the macro variables themselves
are not jointly signiﬁcant. Financial development (column [5]), terms of
trade (column [6]), natural resource exports (column [7]), latitude (column
[8]), and religion (column [9]) are all insigniﬁcant. In almost all cases the co-
eﬃcient on institutions is above 2 in absolute value; the exceptions are when
we control for ﬁnancial development (column [5]) and when we restrict the































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.sample to just former British colonies (column [10]); but even in these cases
the institutions coeﬃcient remains signiﬁcant (although only at the 10 per-
cent level in column [5]). Overall, the results are very similar to our baseline
results, showing that the eﬀect of the historically determined component of
institutions on output collapses is robust and is not simply driven by some
other sources of output crises that are correlated with institutions.
These results conﬁrm the conclusion of the previous section that there
appears to be a close link between institutions and economic instability,
most likely not mediated primarily through the standard macroeconomic
variables or through ﬁnancial development or through reliance on primary
exports. The baseline coeﬃcient estimate is again very large; it suggests
that between 1970 and 1999 Nigeria is likely to have experienced a worst out-
put drop around 10 percentage points worse than that of the United States
(the actual diﬀerence in worst output drop is 13 percentage points).
3.3.4 Exchange Rate Crises
Are institutions also related to exchange rate and balance-of-payments
crises? To answer this question, we use change in the real exchange rate as
a rough but reasonable measure of severity for exchange rate and balance-
of-payments crises.12
In table 3.4 we look at the largest annual change in real exchange rate
90 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson
Fig. 3.7 Worst output drop, 1970–97, against average constraint on executive
12. Note that we use changes in the real exchange rate because in some instances a large
nominal depreciation simply matches high steady inﬂation and is not associated with a crisis.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.over the period 1970–99 using the index of the real exchange rate con-
structed by David Dollar (1992) and updated by Easterly and Levine
(2003). The advantage of this measure is that it allows provides comparable
data for almost all countries.13
Our dependent variable is expressed as a decimal, with a higher positive
number indicating a larger real depreciation. We are comparing the
“worst” (i.e., largest) real depreciation experience of countries. Figure 3.8
shows the OLS relationship. Countries with better institutions experienced
a lower absolute value (i.e., less bad) “worst” real depreciation over this pe-
riod. The OLS coeﬃcient on institutions in column (1), –0.009, indicates
that countries with a 1 point better score in terms of institutions have a
lower (in absolute value) “worst depreciation” by 0.9 percentage points.
When we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality, the co-
eﬃcient on institutions increases in absolute size to –0.048 (with the stan-
dard error rising to 0.024). The coeﬃcient estimate implies that over a
thirty-year period Nigeria’s worst exchange rate depreciation (i.e., argu-
ably part of its worst balance-of-payments crisis) would be 20 percentage
points higher than that of Canada—the actual diﬀerence was nearly 70 per-
centage points.
This large coeﬃcient on institutions is conﬁrmed in the alternative spec-
92 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson
13. The real exchange rate is computed by Easterly and Levine (2003) as the average
amount that domestic prices in U.S. dollars are higher than international prices in U.S. dol-
lars. We omit the United States when we use maximum real devaluation as the dependent vari-
able. However, the United States is included when we use the average real exchange rate over-
valuation as a right-hand-side variable.
Fig. 3.8 Largest real depreciation against average constraint on executiveiﬁcations of table 3.4 (with the same structure of columns as tables 3.2 and
3.3). The coeﬃcient on institutions is always at least –0.04 and is as large
as –0.083 (for the British colonies only in column [10]) and is signiﬁcant in
all columns, except in columns (3), (4), and (5), where we respectively limit
the sample to countries above median world income, control for the macro
variables, and control for ﬁnancial development. None of the control vari-
ables are signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation we have investigated.
3.3.5 Banking Crises
Table 3.5 reports results using an indicator of “systemic” banking crises
as the dependent variable. Our main data source is Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2002), who report data on banking systems, including an indicator
of banking crises for ninety-two countries. However, they do not distin-
guish between large and small crises. For example, in their data the United
States’ savings and loans crisis is coded as a crisis, even though it involved
a relatively small part of the ﬁnancial system. To create a variable measur-
ing “systemic crisis” we use information from Boyd, Kwak, and Smith
(2002), who code whether there was a systemic or nonsystemic banking cri-
sis for a smaller set of countries.14
We have data on banking crises only for 44 former colonies in total, with
25 countries suﬀering systemic banking crises over this time period. Out of
this 44, we also do not have data on institutions or settler mortality for an
additional 8. Most of the missing countries are relatively poor countries in
Africa. Therefore, these results on banking crises should be seen as quite
tentative, mostly as suggesting a promising line for future research.
Column (1) shows an OLS coeﬃcient on institutions of –0.1, with a stan-
dard error of 0.04.15When we instrument for institutions using settler mor-
tality, the coeﬃcient increases in absolute size to –0.15 and the standard er-
ror rises to 0.07. This implies that the 4-point diﬀerence in institutional
scores of Nigeria and the United States should translate into 0.6 diﬀerence
in the probability of a systemic banking crisis, which is again a very large
eﬀect.
The coeﬃcient on institutions is signiﬁcant in all our alternative speciﬁ-
cations, with the exception of column (5), where we control for ﬁnancial
development. The only control variables that are signiﬁcant are the macro
variables, which are jointly signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level in column (4).
Looking just at the twenty countries that are above median world per
capita income and for which we have data (column [3]) suggests a stronger
Institutions, Volatility, and Crises 93
14. More speciﬁcally, we treat all the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2002) crises as systemic
unless Boyd, Kwak, and Smith (2002) indicate otherwise. As a result, Canada, India, and the
United States are reclassiﬁed from 1 to 0.
15. We are estimating a linear probability model using OLS and IV. Such linear probability
models are consistent with both OLS and IV, and, as argued by Angrist (2001), they are con-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.relationship than for the sample as a whole: a coeﬃcient of –0.31 and a
standard error of 0.09. This suggests the possibility that institutions and in-
come need to be above some threshold level before systemic banking crises
occur. Given current data limitations, however, we regard this result with
some caution. Nevertheless, the results in table 3.5 are quite consistent with
what we ﬁnd using more comprehensive data on output and exchange
rates: Worse institutions lead to greater economic instability and crises.
3.3.6 Political Crises
Changes in power in institutionally weak societies may lead to economic
instability, and institutional weaknesses encourage power struggles and in-
crease the likelihood of major shifts in power. This subsection investigates
whether major political crises are more likely when institutions are weak.
To measure political crises we use the data set of the State Failure Task
Force (1998), which indicates periods of “state failures”: that is, major po-
litical crises, such as civil wars, revolutions, and violent ﬁghting between
diﬀerent factions. We supplement this data with information on revolu-
tions from the Barro and Lee (1993) data set. We code a country as having
had a political failure if it had either a state failure according to the State
Failure Task Force (1998) or a revolution or both between 1960 and 1998.
Of the 72 former colonies for which we have data, 56 had a political crisis
deﬁned in this way.
As with our analysis of banking crisis, we emphasize the need for further
research on the issue of who exactly has had what kind of political crisis.
We do not yet know how best to aggregate and compare these crises. Nev-
ertheless, table 3.6 provides a preliminary look at the relationship between
a dummy for “political failure” and initial constraint on the executive, in-
strumented by log settler mortality. Again, the robust if crude result is that
countries with weak institutions at the beginning of the sample were more
likely to suﬀer political failures of some kind over the past thirty to forty
years.
Column (1) of table 3.6 shows an OLS estimate of –0.09 on institutions,
with a standard error of 0.02. As with the previous tables, the absolute
value of the eﬀect of institutions increases when we instrument using log
settler mortality. In column (2), for example, the coeﬃcient on institutions
is –0.14 (standard error of 0.04), and in column (10), for just former British
colonies, the coeﬃcient is –0.16 (standard error of 0.07). This implies, for
example, an approximately 0.56 diﬀerence in the probability of a political
crisis between Nigeria and the United States.
The least signiﬁcant result for institutions is again in column (5), when
we control for ﬁnancial development—the coeﬃcient on institutions is
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. Again, ﬁnancial development itself is
not signiﬁcant. None of the other control variables in table 3.6 are signiﬁ-
cant, apart from the macro policy variables (column [4]), which are jointly



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Taken separately, government consump-
tion and the overvaluation of the real exchange rate are signiﬁcant: More
government consumption is associated with greater probability of a polit-
ical crisis, and a more appreciated real exchange rate is associated with a
lower probability of a political crisis.
As with our analysis of banking crises, we regard these results for polit-
ical crises as suggestive but very preliminary. We need more work that
looks carefully at the determinants and eﬀects of diﬀerent kinds of crises.
Nevertheless, table 3.6 suggests that political crises are in some way inti-
mately tied to the process through which relatively weak institutions gen-
erate greater economic instability.
3.4 Conclusion
Taken together, the results presented in this paper suggest an important
link between institutions and economic (and most likely political) instabil-
ity. The historically determined component of institutions has a ﬁrst-order
eﬀect on volatility, severity of economic crises, exchange rate crises, sys-
temic banking crises, and political crises. This eﬀect is robust to including
the obvious control variables and to restricting the sample to just countries
above median world income or just former British colonies. Our interpre-
tation is that institutional diﬀerences across countries are a fundamental
determinant of economic and political instability. However, a great deal
more research is needed before we fully understand exactly how, when, and
why institutions cause instability.
Appendix
Table 3A.1 Country Abbreviations
Abbreviation Abbreviation






















Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY
Ethiopia ETH
Gabon GABTable 3A.1 (continued)
Abbreviation Abbreviation
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Comment Steve Dowrick
This paper is part of an ongoing and important research program into the
impact of current institutions on economic development. In an earlier pa-
per, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) proposed a novel solution
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of Economics, Australian National University.to the problem of identifying the exogenous component of institutional
quality in their analysis of the determinants of the current levels of real
GDP per capita in countries that had been subject to European coloniza-
tion. Their instrumental variable was the mortality rate among the clergy
and military at the beginning of the colonization period. Their argument is
that these mortality rates were well recorded and publicized, inﬂuencing
the subsequent pattern of European settlement and hence not only the na-
ture of colonial institutions of property rights and democracy but also the
nature of current institutions. Furthermore, they presented evidence that
the impact of disease on the early colonizers was distinct from its impact
on the indigenous population, both then and now.
Here the same approach is taken to identifying the impact of current in-
stitutions on various measures of economic volatility, including the vari-
ability of output growth, exchange rate depreciation, banking crises, and
political crises.
The authors’ solution to the identiﬁcation problem is ingenious. It is
backed up convincingly both by a well-researched historical narrative (pre-
sented in more detail in their earlier paper) and by careful statistical test-
ing of the requirement that their instrumental variable should be orthogo-
nal to a range of other variables that might inﬂuence their dependent
variables, such as inﬂation and terms-of-trade shocks and latitude. Of
course, one could continue to search for other variables that are correlated
with settler mortality and also inﬂuence current volatility, but to my mind
the authors have canvassed the most likely candidates, and their results do
appear to be robust.
In fact, my only concern with the paper is that the authors have probably
overstated the economic signiﬁcance of their results. Although they have
identiﬁed the impact of the exogenous component of institutional quality
on volatility, that impact may be relatively small compared with other inﬂu-
ences on volatility. For example, the paper compares the predicted impact
of institutional quality on the diﬀerence in output growth volatility between
the United States and Nigeria, ﬁnding that the diﬀerence in quality scores
explains two-thirds of the diﬀerence in volatility. Examination of ﬁgure 3.2,
which illustrates the scatter plot of output volatility against the instrumen-
tal variable, suggests that the authors have chosen to compare a pair of
countries most favorable to their hypothesis. Nigeria and the United States
are not only close to the extremes of the settler mortality variable, but also
close to the linear regression line illustrated in the ﬁgure. Since settler mor-
tality is the only instrumental variable, the predicted eﬀect of institutional
quality in the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation is likely to be close
to the illustrated ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on the instrument.
Hence, the choice of a pair of countries lying further away from the regres-
sion line—for example, comparing Indonesia with Gabon, or comparing
Mali with Fiji—would probably lead to the conclusion that institutional
quality diﬀerences explain relatively little of the diﬀerence in volatility.
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pair of countries, the authors should compare all the predicted values of
their 2SLS regression with the actual values, perhaps reporting the corre-
lation coeﬃcient. I suspect that they will ﬁnd that their instrumented mea-
sure of institutional quality does not explain a large part of the overall
variance in measures of volatility. If so, that is important to note. But it
does not detract from the value of the paper in identifying an exogenous
component of institutional quality and demonstrating that it has a sys-
tematic and robust impact on economic volatility.
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Comment Dipinder S. Randhawa
Simon Johnson and his coauthors (hereafter AJR) oﬀer a remarkably lu-
cid, creative, and cogent analysis of the origins of institutions and their
links to current economic performance. This paper contends that societies
that for historical reasons have weak institutions have suﬀered substan-
tially more output volatility and experienced more severe output contrac-
tion, exchange rate depreciation, and banking and political crisis over the
past thirty years.
It is an extension of the authors’ earlier work examining diﬀerential rates
of growth among former European colonies. The line of reasoning, draw-
ing upon data on mortality rates among bishops, sailors, and soldiers from
the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, contends that the mortality
rates among the European settlers inﬂuenced the prospects for settlements.
Evolving settlements in turn led to the creation of institutions. The legacy
of these institutions was sustained into the postcolonial period with pro-
found implications for economic growth (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son 2001). This paper extends the analysis to look at the origins of insta-
bility and crisis in developing economies.
The focus is on countries colonized by the European powers. The
authors document that diﬀerent colonization strategies and diﬀerent in-
stitutions set up by Europeans had radically diﬀerent implications for eco-
nomic development. Places prospered when Europeans “set up institu-
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ness School.tions that protected private property rights, enforced the rule of law, and
placed tight constraints on politicians and powerful elites. In contrast, ar-
eas where Europeans established new extractive institutions, or took over
existing ones, stagnated or grew only slowly.”
The current project constitutes a valuable addition to the literature
linking institutional structures with long-term development. The logic is
compelling. The stated objective is to demonstrate “the eﬀect of historical
institutions on economic development by exploiting variation in the
feasibility of large-scale settlements by Europeans.” Accordingly, Euro-
peans built settlements in areas where the incidence of mortality and mor-
bidity was low. Areas with high incidence of disease and mortality were not
deemed attractive for settlement. The diﬀerential settlement patterns re-
sulting from diﬀerences in mortality rates resulted in distinct patterns of
economic activity. In areas where settlers suﬀered high mortality rates, the
form of economic exchange was extractive. In these areas, the colonizers
were much more likely to exploit the native population for the beneﬁt of a
few rich Europeans, and these institutions have proved incompatible with
sustained rapid growth.
Based on this approach, AJR use mortality rates faced by European set-
tlers as an instrumental variable for institutional development and current
institutions. There is a strong and robust relationship between per capital
income growth rates (as a measure of long-term development) and mortal-
ity rates. The interpretation is that this relationship reﬂects the eﬀect of his-
torically determined institutions (more speciﬁcally, institutions shaped by
diﬀerential European settlement patterns) on instability. They further con-
tend that not only did societies that inherited extractive institutions from
their colonial past fail to take advantage of development opportunities
over the long run, but their recent medium-run experience has been char-
acterized by frequent crises and substantial instability.
Causality (Embedded and Explicit)
A ﬁrst reading of the paper may be misleading. Although proposed as
such in the text, the data at hand and a perusal of the demographics of set-
tlements do not suggest a monotonic relationship between mortality rates
and settlements—an embedded assumption, albeit not crucial to the cen-
tral relationship between the development of institutions and crisis. It
seems unlikely we can obtain a monotonic relationship among experiences
as diverse as the Spanish expansion in Latin America, which resulted in
large European settlements in the midst of high mortality rates, or the
Dutch in Indonesia, where high mortality rates led to small settlements yet
the small cohort of settlers remained engaged primarily in lucrative in-
traregional trade.
A clearer line of causality emerges from the postcolonial institutional
setup and its impact on economic development and vulnerability of the
Institutions, Volatility, and Crises 105economy to crisis. That there is continuity in the development and eﬀec-
tiveness of institutions in the pre- and postcolonial periods is widely ac-
knowledged, but the embedded contention that these institutional charac-
teristics are immutable over time is yet to be established. The import of this
assertion, seemingly an illustration of predestination, is that postcolonial
initiatives toward institutional development matter little for economic per-
formance. It implicitly abstracts from postcolonial policy regimes and all
the changes therein—where, at the very least, a number of economies tran-
sitioned from an import substitution strategy of industrialization to export
orientation, often with commensurate changes in institutional structures.
The measures and proxies of institutions deployed all draw upon institu-
tional constructs of the past thirty years (contemporary institutions).
A switching regime model to ascertain whether there is a change in the
colonial regime and postindependence policy regime would provide vali-
dation for implicit causality and oﬀer a direct link between current perfor-
mance and regimes established during the colonial period. At issue also are
questions about the robustness of instrumental variables, including mor-
tality rates.
The innovative use of mortality rates as an instrumental variable for set-
tlements and institutional development during the colonial expansion is
fascinating; however, its linkages with current institutions, on both the the-
oretical (or intuitive) and the empirical plane, are less clear. Incorporation
of a control variable reﬂecting postindependence policy regimes may
strengthen the line of causation. This assumes importance given the vari-
ability in regimes across and within (chronologically) former colonies. It
leaves open an arena for subsequent research to inquire into the linkages
between institutions, macroeconomic policy, and economic performance.
Proxies for Instability
The AJR paper uses ﬁve proxies for instability: output volatility, the
most severe drop in output, largest exchange rate depreciation, and
dummy variables for banking crises and political crises. The results are tab-
ulated in table 3C.1. By and large, the ﬁndings lend support to the choice
of the instrumental variable; nevertheless, considerable ambiguity prevails.
The authors propose the framework as a blueprint to encourage other re-
searchers to delve into the area.
Data problems on a project of this scope are substantial. A rich retinue
of macroeconomic variables testiﬁes to the robustness of the instrumental
variable, especially vis-à-vis output volatility and the worst loss in output.
Variation in output is an appealing measure of volatility. The choice of
worst drop in output over a period in excess of twenty-ﬁve years raises a
few questions. The prevailing exchange rate regime, the extent of openness
of the economy, and the timing of external help or of implementation of an
International Monetary Fund program have signiﬁcant ramiﬁcations for
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or otherwise).
The proxy for exchange rate crisis—the magnitude of exchange rate de-
preciation—is likely to be impacted by all the factors previously men-
tioned, including openness of the economy and the nature of the exchange
rate crisis.
Considering banking and political crises as binary variables may have
contributed to the indecisive results—in the case of the former, a widely
used measure conveying the intensity of the crisis is the cost (in terms of
GDP) of rehabilitating the banking sector.
The intuition behind using measures such as “the largest drop in output”
or the “percentage depreciation” is not clear. There is a large body of liter-
ature that addresses the role of policy regimes, the extent of openness of the
economy, and the level of indebtedness as being the prime determinants of
the intensity of the crisis.
Financial Development
The debate on what constitutes an appropriate measure of ﬁnancial de-
velopment and, if we do agree on the issue, what indeed a measure of ﬁ-
nancial development does reﬂect, is an open issue. Therein may lie the an-
swer to the ambiguous results obtained for the two measures of crisis.
The proxy M2/GDP, a widely used measure of ﬁnancial development,
reﬂects the extent of monetization of the economy. In a broader sense, ﬁ-
nancial development is now deemed to reﬂect not only the eﬃcacy of in-
termediation but also the screening and monitoring functions performed
by markets and institutions. A single-dimensional variable may not be ad-
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Table 3C.1 Summary of Results: 1970–97
Result for Instrumental Variable 
Proxy for Instability Variable (mortality levels)
Output volatility Standard deviation of PCY GDP  Signiﬁcant
growth rate
Worst drop in output Worst annual PCY GDP growth rate Signiﬁcant
Exchange rate Standard deviation of terms-of-trade  Signiﬁcant, except when controlled 
shocks for ﬁnancial development and macro 
policy variables
Banking crisis Binary (dummy) variable Signiﬁcant, except when controlled 
for ﬁnancial development and macro 
policy variables
Political crisis Binary (dummy) variable Signiﬁcant, except when controlled 
for ﬁnancial development and some 
macro policy variables
Note: PCY   per capita income.equately equipped to reﬂect these attributes. Studies have documented
strong relationships between ﬁnancial liberalization and ﬁnancial devel-
opment—the primary motivation behind the recommendation of deregu-
lation of the ﬁnancial sector. Experiences dating back to Chile and the
Southern Cone of Latin America in the late seventies and early eighties tes-
tify to the folly of blanket deregulation, in contrast to the more interven-
tionist policy regimes among the two generations of Asian tigers, which
was an essential construct underlying the Asian Miracle. Of course, some
deem the same set of policies to have undone the “miracle” in 1997. Per-
haps the route to take on this issue is the one sought by a number of re-
searchers in the literature on ﬁnancial crisis: that is, to seek that conﬁgura-
tion of institutional frailties and macroeconomic vulnerabilities that give
rise to ﬁnancial fragility and crisis.
The debate on the speed and extent of ﬁnancial liberalization remains
unresolved. Positive real interest rates almost unequivocally lead to ﬁnan-
cial deepening (increasing M2/GDP). Strengthening of institutions for ﬁ-
nancial development requires a range of commensurate initiatives that
researchers are yet to pin down. As the authors point out, the precise
mechanisms (linking institutions with growth and instability) are not clear,
and a great deal more research is needed on the theoretical and empirical
relationship between institutional weaknesses and instability.
Along with its precursor (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001), this
paper performs a stellar role in laying out a blueprint for inquiring into the
origins of institutions and delineating their impact on growth and stability.
One would expect a new strand of the literature tackling the range of issues
addressed in this paper. To that end, the authors not only have made a valu-
able contribution, but will indeed have provided an impetus to research in
the ﬁeld.
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